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ARTICLES
PLAYER DISCIPLINE IN TEAM SPORTS
JAN STIGLITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to briefly outline the issues involved in
disciplining athletes in this country's four major team sports: baseball,
football, hockey and basketball. As anyone familiar with the industry
knows, we live in changing times; only football has a long term labor
agreement. This makes it particularly difficult to definitively explicate
the disciplinary process. Similarly, one can hardly speak with any au-
thority about the power of the Commissioner of baseball when there
isn't one, and the owners have just recently rewritten the rules which
define the Commissioner's powers. But there are enough similarities in
the historical disciplinary structures of the four leagues to create a
framework for analysis and highlight the major problem areas.
This article will first present an overview of the structure of the in-
dustry, its disciplinary mechanisms, and the legal issues that are impli-
cated. The article will then outline the specific disciplinary framework




In order to understand the issues involved in athlete discipline in
team sports, it is necessary to understand the particular structure of the
typical sports league. In this structure, there are a number of individuals
and entities who have significant rights and power. Unlike the tradi-
tional employment setting, where the "company" is the only source of
discipline, in professional team sports, there is an additional source of
discipline: the league.
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; J.D. 1975, Albany Law School;
LL.M. 1980, Harvard Law School. This article was originally presented in conjunction with
the American Bar Association's Forum Committee on Entertainment and Sports Law Annual
Meeting, October 14-15, 1994, in San Francisco, California.
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In team sports, the "company" is the player's club. But athletes in
the four major team sports are also subject to discipline by the league,
which acts through its president or commissioner. Moreover, in the case
of baseball, there is an additional level of disciplinary authority because
Major League Baseball is comprised of two, somewhat autonomous
leagues. Each league has a President, who exercises a certain amount of
disciplinary authority.'
Another significant "player," in terms of disciplinary authority, is the
on the field official. Misconduct on the playing field is a very common
basis for discipline. The actions of the umpire or referee, and that offi-
cial's report of the incident, may ultimately determine whether an ath-
lete is disciplined and what the level of discipline will be. For example,
in football, ejection from a game can be the basis of a fine.2 Similarly, in
hockey, the on-ice officials have the power to suspend a player for up to
twenty games.3
B. The "Rules"
The relationships between these actors are governed by a set of inter-
related documents which need to be reviewed in order to determine who
can impose discipline, under what circumstances, subject to what limits,
and with what scope of review. Typically there are three basic docu-
ments to be considered.
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
When all goes well, there is the collective bargaining agreement, en-
tered into between the union and the league, which governs the terms
and conditions of employment. The typical collective bargaining agree-
ment will have one or more sections devoted to discipline.4 This part of
the collective bargaining agreement will be a primary source for the
rules determining who can impose discipline and under what circum-
1. See BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMRmicAN LEAGUE OF BASEBALL CLUBS AND
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS As-
SOCIATION of January 1, 1990, Art. XII (A). [Hereinafter "MLB-CBA"].
2. NFL COLLECrIVE BARGANUNG AGREEMENT 1993-2000, Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (a). [Herein-
after "NFL-CBA"].
3. See NHL CONSTITMON, Art's. 2.1 (c) and 11.1.
4. See MLB-CBA Art. XII; NFL-CBA Art. Art's. VII and XI; CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BAS-
KETBALL PLAYERS AsSOCIATION of November 1, 1988, Art. XXVII, § 3 (d), [hereinafter
"NBA-CBA"]; MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL HoCKEY
LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION - September 16, 1991,
to September 15, 1993, Art. IV, § 4.02, [hereinafter "NHL-CBA"].
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stances. The collective bargaining agreement will also have a grievance
procedure.5 In the event of a dispute over the imposition of discipline,
the collective bargaining agreement will establish who ultimately decides
whether the discipline was appropriate. Finally, the collective bargaining
agreement will contain important procedural rules, regarding such issues
as notice, time limits, discovery, and representational rights.
For example, the article on discipline in the current collective bar-
gaining agreement in baseball provides that a player can be subjected to
discipline for "just cause" by "his Club, League or the Commissioner."'6
The agreement also provides for notice7 and discovery rights." Finally,
the agreement sets out a grievance procedure, which gives the player the
right to have most disputes resolved by a neutral arbitrator.9
2. The Uniform Player Contract
In the traditional industrial setting, the collective bargaining agree-
ment governs salaries for all covered employees. By tradition, in team
sports, the collective bargaining agreement contains the general terms
and conditions of employment but only sets forth the minimum salary.
Athletes have been allowed to individually negotiate salaries and certain
other perks and benefits with their teams, so long as these agreements
do not diminish the minimum rights and benefits awarded under the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 10 The vehicle for memorializing and gov-
erning this individual player-club agreement is the "Uniform" or
"Standard" player contract. This contract may contain provisions which
directly affect discipline.
For example, the ultimate discipline is discharge. The Uniform
Player's Contract in baseball contains the provisions under which the
club can terminate the contract and thus the player's employment."
Paragraph 7(b)(1) of the Uniform Player's Contract states that the club
may terminate the contract if the player shall: "fail, refuse or neglect to
5. MLB-CBA Art. XI; NFL-CBA Art. IX; NBA-CBA Art. XXVIII; NHL-CBA Art. IV.
6. MLB-CBA Art. XII (A).
7. Id at Art. XII (B).
8. Id. at Art. XII (C).
9. Id. at Art. XI (A)(1). Technically, the arbitration is held before a tripartite panel. But
in reality, there is one arbitrator and two party advocates.
10. The collective bargaining agreement will usually have some language which amounts
to a "supremacy clause." See, e.g., id. at Art. III- UNmo1m PLAYERS' CoNmRAcr. See also,
id at Art. II - Recognition, which allows a player to individually negotiate salary "over and
above the minimum requirements" and special covenants which "actually or potentially pro-
vide additional benefits to the Player."
11. See Ud at UNFORM PLAYER'S CoNTRAcr, Art. 7.
1995]
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conform his personal conduct to the standards of good citizenship and*
good sportsmanship oy to keep himself in first-class physical condition or
to obey the Club's training rules."
The Uniform Player's Contract in baseball also has "Regulations"
which govern a player's conduct and give the clubs the right to discipline
the player. Paragraph 5 of the Regulations provides that the club may
impose a "reasonable fine" or suspend a player for up to thirty days for a
violation of a regulation or provision of the contract.
Additionally, a player's contract may contain special covenants, like
a weight clause, or an agreement not to participate in certain other
sports. The breach of one of these special covenants might also give rise
to discipline by the club.
A special covenant may also be included to more precisely define
conduct that could give rise to discipline or termination. For example,
one recommended addendum to the Uniform Player Contract in basket-
ball contains a provision under which a player acknowledges that a crim-
inal conviction for a felony would constitute a basis for discharge under
the "personal conduct" standards of the contract.12
Conversely, special covenants may limit the effect of discipline. In
basketball, a player and team may enter into a covenant which guaran-
tees that the player's salary will be paid even if the player's contract is
terminated by reason of his personal conduct.' 3
3. The League Constitution and By-Laws
Each league is an entity unto itself, which has been created by certain
governing documents. These documents generally call for a chief execu-
tive and give that chief executive some plenary power to act in the best
interests of the sport. That power can be exercised to discipline league
participants including owners, coaches and players.
For example, until the recent debacle involving the firing of Fay Vin-
cent, Major League Baseball gave its commissioner the power to repri-
mand, fine, suspend or remove any player who engages in conduct
"which is deemed by the Commissioner not to be in the best interests of
Baseball."' 4 Similar disciplinary power is given to the Commissioner of
12. See MARTIN J. GREENBERG, 2 SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 247 (1993).
13. NBA-CBA Art. 1, §§ 3 (d)(ii) and 4 (b).
14. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, Art. I, § 3.
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the NFL, 5 the Commissioner of the NBA,'6 and the President of the
NIL.17
4. Other Relevant Documents
While the uniform contract, the collective bargaining agreement, and
the constitutions are implicated in most discipline cases, there are often
other agreements or rules which come into play. For example, one of
the most important disciplinary rules in baseball is Rule 21 of the "Major
League Rules." Rule 21 proscribes a variety of misconduct, including
fixing games or failing to report an attempt to induce a player to fix a
game,"'8 accepting gifts for defeating a competing club,19 giving gifts to
umpires,20 betting on baseball games, 2' and attacking another player or
an umpire during a game.2 Rule 21 also has a catchall "best interests of
Baseball" provision.23
Similarly, the individual clubs, as employers, may have their own
rules which modify or govern the relationship between the player and
the club. In basketball, for example, the collective bargaining agreement
provides for a set of Standard Club Rules which govern a player's
conduct.24
Finally, since discipline frequently arises as a result of on the field
conduct, the playing rules of a sport may be relevant.
5. The Interplay of the Rules
Careful attention must always be given to how the various documents
relate to each other. While the constitution of a league may purport to
give its commissioner unlimited authority to impose discipline, that au-
thority may be curtailed or subject to outside review as a result of the
15. See NATIONAL FooTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, Art. VIII, §§ 8.13
and 8.14 (1988).
16. See NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION AN By- LAWS, par. 24
and 35 (1989).
17. See NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE CONSTnUTION AND BY-LAws, §§ 17 and 18 (1991).
18. MAJOR LEAGUE RuLEs, Rule 21 (a).
19. Id. at Rule 21 (b).
20. Id. at Rule 21 (d).
21. Id. As the followers of the Pete Rose saga may already know, this rule calls for a one
year suspension for any player (or umpire or club or league official) who bets on any game,
and a lifetime ban for any player (or umpire or club or league official) who bets on a game in
which "he has a duty to perform."
22. Id. at Rule 21 (e).
23. Id. at Rule 21 (f).
24. NBA-CBA Art. XXIII.
1995]
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collective bargaining process and provisions incorporated into the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
One illustration of the interplay of these documents is what hap-
pened in the early baseball drug cases. Pursuant to the catchall "best
interests of baseball" provision of Rule 21, the Commissioner had
adopted a rule that "[a]nyone involved in the illegal possession or use of
drugs or illegal trafficking with drugs... will be subject to discipline." In
1983, four members of the Kansas City Royals were convicted of pos-
sessing cocaine and sentenced to jail. As a result of these drug convic-
tions, and under the authority of Rule 21, Commissioner Bowie Kuhn
suspended each player for one year.
The players challenged the Commissioner's action. In deciding these
cases, the arbitrator ruled that the Commissioner did have a legitimate
interest in the problem of drug use and had the right to impose disci-
pline. But the players were successful in arguing that the action of the
Commissioner was subject to the grievance procedure and reviewable
through binding neutral arbitration?25 Since that time, the Major League
Baseball Players Association has successfully challenged the imposition
of discipline by the Commissioner in a number of cases and had that
discipline reduced.26
C. The Law
It is important to remember that the industry doesn't exist in a vac-
uum or get to create it's own legal world. With one notable exception,27
sports are subject to external law. In the context of understanding the
disciplinary process, two bodies of substantive law have particular appli-
cation: labor law and private association law.
25. See In the Matter of Arbitration Between Major League Players Ass'n (Ferguson Jen-
kins) and Major League Player Relations Comm. (Commissioner Bowie Kuhn), Decision No.
41, Gr. No. 80-25 (1980); In the Matter of Arbitration Between Bowie K. Kuhn, Commis-
sioner of Baseball and Major League Players Ass'n (Willie Wilson, Jerry Martin) Panel Deci-
sion No. 54, Gr. Nos. 84-1 and 84-2 (April 3, 1984); In the Matter of Arbitration Between
Major League Players Ass'n (Pascual Perez) and Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball,
Gr. No. 84-0 (April 27, 1984).
26. The most recent illustration of this was the reinstatement of pitcher Steve Howe after
his suspension by Commissioner Vincent. See In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Ass'n. and The Commissioner of Baseball, Gr. No. 92-7, 1992
(George Nicolou, Ch.).
27. See the infamous decision in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which reaffirmed the
proposition that baseball was not subject to antitrust law.
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1. Labor Law
As indicated, the disciplinary structures in the major team sports
have been incorporated into collective agreements, negotiated by the
various players associations. These associations are labor unions, which
derive their authority from virtue of Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.'
One critical feature of labor law is that the union is the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. 9 As a result,
attorneys and player agents can only participate in a collectively bar-
gained grievance procedure if the union consents to such representation.
In some cases, the unions have welcomed participation by representa-
tives chosen by the players.3 0 In other cases, the union is designated as
the official representative and the appearance and participation of an
agent or attorney is a matter of discretion.3 '
The flip side of the principle of exclusive representation in the
union's "duty of fair representation." A union must represent all of its
members "fairly, impartially, and in good faith."32 So even if the em-
ployee is not allowed to select his own representative, the union is obli-
gated to provide fair representation to all.
Another critical feature of the labor law is that it makes the collective
bargaining agreement the supreme governing authority regarding the
terms and conditions of employment. It also precludes an employer
from changing those terms and conditions without engaging in collective
bargaining.33 This has served to dramatically limit the authority of the
commissioners.
For example, in one case, Pete Rozelle was precluded from promul-
gating a rule regarding players leaving the bench and imposing fines on
28. 29 U.S.C. § 167.
29. See § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
30. Art. IX, § 9 of the NFL-CBA allows a player to be represented by an attorney of his
own choosing at any disciplinary hearing.
31. Under the Rules of Procedure for grievance arbitration in baseball, (which also gov-
ern hearings before the Commissioner and the League Presidents), a player has the right to be
represented by the Players Association. Unless an attorney or agent has a "direct interest in
the arbitration," his or her attendance appears to be discretionary with whoever is presiding.
(See MAJOR LEAGUE RuLs, Rules 2 [Attendance at Hearings] and 3 [Conduct of Hearings]).
As a matter of practice, however, agents and attorneys have been allowed to be present and
participate.
32. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
33. The author recognizes that this is a gross oversimplification and apologizes to any
labor law aficionado who is offended by this cursory treatment of a subject fraught with excep-
tion and nuance.
1995]
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players under that rule, because his action was held to be the action of
the employer, and constituted a unilateral change in the rights negoti-
ated under the collective bargaining agreement. 34 In another case, an
arbitrator ruled that Pete Rozelle could not unilaterally impose a new
drug program, which included the unscheduled drug testing of players'
because that too constituted a unilateral change in the terms and condi-
tions of employment which could only be effectuated through collective
bargaining. 35
Another important consequence of the fact that the grievance proce-
dure is a creature of and governed by labor law, is the way in which
arbitration awards are treated. Under a group of cases known as the
Steelworkers Trilogy,3 6 the courts give great deference to arbitration
awards and will almost never overturn them.37 Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, once an arbitrator has made a ruling on the propriety of discipline,
that ruling is final.
2. Private Association Law
Equally important is an area of law known as private association law.
One general principle in private association law is that courts will hesi-
tate to interfere with internal disputes involving members of a private
association.38 This principle will have application in any case where a
34. See National Football League Players Association v. National Labor Relations Board,
503 F.2d 12 (1974). For a history of football's struggle with the issue of drug testing see David
Sisson & Brian Trexell, The National Football League's Substance Abuse Policy: Is Further
Conflict Between Player and Management Inevitable:, 2 MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 1 (1991).
35. See National Football League Players Association and National Football League Man-
agement Council and the National Football League (Kasher, Arb.)(October 25, 1986). For a
history of baseball's struggle over the Commissioner's power to institute drug testing, see,
Glenn Wong & Richard Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight the Problem or the
Player?, 11 NovA L. Rv. 779 (1987).
36. Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
37. The most dramatic illustration of this in the sports context relates to free agency in
baseball. Free agency was originally the product of a an arbitration award in the so-called
Messersmith-McNally case. (In re The Twelve Clubs Comprising National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs and Twelve Clubs Comprising American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, Los Angeles and Montreal Clubs and Major League Baseball Players Association,
Or. Nos. 75-27 and 75-23, 66 LAB. ARB. 101 (Seitz, Chairman) (December 23, 1975.)
Although the decision dramatically changed the entire structure of the industry, the courts
refused to interfere and overturn it. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League
Baseball Players Association, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
38. A most dramatic illustration of this principal occurred in Carr v. St.John's University,
17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962), where the court refused to interfere with a univer-
sity's decision to expel Catholic students who had participated in a civil marriage ceremony.
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player has been disciplined by a commissioner and seeks to have that
decision reviewed by a court.
One famous illustration of this was the case of Finley v. Kuhn.39 In
1976, Charles Finley sold the rights to Joe Rudi and Rollie Fingers to the
Boston Red Sox and the rights to Vida Blue to the New York Yankees.
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn disapproved the assignments as "inconsis-
tent with the best interests of baseball." Finley then sued, challenging
Kuhn's authority. The court looked to see whether the Commissioner
had acted in good faith. Once the court determined that Kuhn had acted
in good faith, it refused to look at whether Kuhn was "right or wrong."
That issue was "beyond the competence" of the court. Similarly, most
courts would not want to second guess David Stern as to what fine is
appropriate when two players get into a fight during a basketball.
But there are other principles of private association law which may
give a player a basis for challenging disciplinary action by a commis-
sioner.40 First, one can challenge any action that exceeds the legitimate
authority granted to the commissioner. In Atlanta National League
Baseball Club & Ted Turner v. Bowie Kuhn,41 the Commissioner sus-
pended Ted Turner for one year for tampering with another club's
player. Kuhn also took away Atlanta's first round draft pick. Turner
sued and the court held that it must not look closely at the reasons ad-
vanced for the discipline: "What conduct is 'not in the best interests of
baseball' is of course, a question which addresses itself to the Commis-
sioner, not this court." But the court reversed Kuhn as to the forfeiture
of the draft pick, finding that such a penalty was not authorized by the
Major League Agreement, which was the source of the Kuhn's power.
This principle of ultra vires was also the basis upon which the Chicago
Cubs was able to successfully challenge Fay Vincent's unilateral realign-
ment of the divisions in the National League.42
Finally, a commissioner's actions may be challenged for procedural
correctness. While private actors are not subject to the due process
clause of the U.S. Constitution, certain principles of procedural fairness
39. 569 F.2d 527 (1978).
40. See generally Matthew Conway, Sports Commissioners or Judges: Who Should Make
the Call When the Game Is Over?, XXIV Suu.ouc U. L. REv. 1043 (1990).
41. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (1977).
42. Chicago National League Ball Club Inc. v. Francis Vincent, Jr., No. 92 C 4398
(U.S.D.C., N.D.Ill. 1992) (unreported). See also Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club Limited Partnership, 373 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (the court disagreed
with a commissioner's broad interpretation of his powers); Riko Enterprises v. Seattle Super-
sonics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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are required when discipline is imposed by a private association upon a
member or employee. This was the basis of Pete Rose's challenge to the
discipline by Bart Giamatti.
Under the Major League Agreement, the Commissioner had the
power to both investigate and impose appropriate discipline for gam-
bling.43 The Commissioner was also given the power to promulgate
rules of procedure, which rules were to recognize the right of any party
to appear and be heard.44 When Bart Giamatti heard rumors about
gambling by Pete Rose, he hired John Dowd, a Washington D.C. lawyer,
to investigate. Dowd's investigation resulted in a lengthy report, which
based its conclusions on the accusations and testimony of two key infor-
mants: Ron Peters and Paul Janszen.
After receiving the report, but prior to holding any hearing on the
Rose matter, Giamatti wrote a letter to a U.S. District Court judge who
was about to sentence Peters for drug and income tax related crimes. In
that letter, Giamatti stated that Peters had been "candid, forthright and
truthful" in providing testimony against Rose.
The judge sent a copy of that letter to Rose's attorney. Rose's attor-
ney then filed an action to enjoin the Commissioner from taking any
further disciplinary action against Rose. He argued that the letter
showed that Giamatti had literally "pre" judged the matter and that
Rose was being denied his right to a proceeding conducted with "due
regard for all the principles of natural justice and fair play." Based on
this argument, Rose was successful in winning a 10-day restraining order.
The Rose case was ultimately settled, with Rose acceding to disci-
pline by the Commissioner. But the notion that some kind of fundamen-
tal fairness and due process is required was, nonetheless, established.45
III. CATEGORIES OF DISCIPLINE
The way discipline in imposed, contested and resolved, i.e., the struc-
tural mechanism is usually a function of the nature of the discipline and
the kind of conduct that is involved. In this regard, it might be helpful to
think of discipline as falling into three thematic groups: on the field mis-
conduct, contract related discipline, and integrity related misconduct.
43. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, Art. I, § 2 (a) & (b).
44. MAJOR LEAGUE RuLEs, Art. I, § 2 (d).
45. For a more comprehensive treatment of the Pete Rose saga and the power of commis-
sioners, see, Matthew Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of professional Sports
Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Contro-
versy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409 (1990).
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A. On the Field Misconduct
On the field discipline would include actions taken against a player
for excessive violence, attacking another player, or misconduct involving
an umpire or referee. As a general rule, discipline for on the field mis-
conduct is initiated by a representative of the league (either a game offi-
cial or someone appointed by the commissioner) and is ultimately
resolved by a representative of the league (usually, the commissioner).
While it is a frequent source of discipline, the issues are relatively simple.
In addition, because the discipline stems from the game itself, the appro-
priateness of discipline, and the legitimacy of league self-rule, are gener-
ally accepted.
Examples of this kind of discipline are legion. In 1991, Ed Balfour of
the Chicago Blackhawks was fined $600 for entering a referees dressing
room after a game to dispute a call. Vince Coleman was suspended for
seven days and fined an undisclosed amount for arguing with and bump-
ing an umpire. Roger Clemens was suspended for five games and fined
$10,000 for the dispute which led to his ejection in a 1990 American
League Play-Off game. Mark Bavaro was fined $7,500 by Commissioner
Tagliabue for a 1990 incident where he made accidentally knocked down
an umpire who tried to break up a argument Bavaro was having with
another player.46
B. Contract Related Discipline
Contract related discipline would involve violations of club rules, or
the regulatory provisions of the contract between the player and the
club. Contractual discipline is usually initiated by the club, and in most
cases, the ultimate authority is a neutral arbitrator. The issues here, e.g.,
discipline for lateness, violating a weight clause, are ones that are analo-
gous to non-sports settings and the typical labor relations grievance pro-
cess seems most appropriate.
C. Integrity Related Misconduct
Integrity related discipline would include issues like gambling, drugs,
and other off the field conduct which might effect the public's view of the
player or the sport. Integrity related discipline is the most difficult area.
On the one hand, the leagues have a legitimate interest in ensuring pub-
lic respect for the product. And historically, giving broad disciplinary
46. MARTIN J. GREENBERG, 1 SPoRTS LAW PRAcrcE 1177 (1993).
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power to a commissioner has helped to keep the public's respect.4 7 But
from the players' perspective, there are core privacy issues involved in
the regulation of off the field behavior. Moreover, the level of discipline
implicated in cases of serious off the field misconduct is such that having
a neutral decision maker can be of critical importance.
Some examples of the kinds of discipline which fall under the um-
brella of integrity related misconduct are well known. Gambling is one
important category. Pete Rose was banned for life as a result of gam-
bling.4" So too was Jack Molinas, of NBA infamy.49 In football, Paul
Hornung and Alex Karras were each suspended for one year for gam-
bling on a football game.
Perhaps the largest group of cases under this category relate to drugs.
As a result, they will be treated separately. But there is a wide variety of
behavior that can come under this heading. For example, Zeke Mowatt
and other members of the New England Patriots were fined for sexually
harassing Lisa Olson, a female reporter, in the locker room. Vince Cole-
man's throwing a firecracker towards some fans and the almost daily
assortment of police blotter items that involve athletes are also in this
category.50
D. Drug Related Discipline
An unfortunate number of professional athletes have used drugs and
this has created host of special problems. Drug use can tarnish the pub-
lic's view of a sport, can impair an athlete's ability to perform (and thus
destroy a club's investment), and can pose serious health problems for
the athlete. From the athlete's perspective, there are some serious pri-
vacy issues, especially with regard to the question of testing.5'
Because this is a particularly sensitive area, each league has struggled
to come up with a comprehensive program that is acceptable to the play-
ers. In some cases agreement has been reached. For example, the NBA
has a comprehensive anti-drug program which is incorporated in its col-
lective bargaining agreement with the players. The league offers treat-
47. For example, the general sports public was supportive of Fay Vincent's suspension of
Steve Howe and outraged when it was overturned through arbitration.
48. Although Pete Rose was a manager at the time, the lifetime ban is the same for play-
ers and managers and in both cases, the Commissioner has the right to impose discipline.
49. See Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
50. Just imagine the difficult issue that would face Commissioner Tagliabue if OJ. Simp-
son were an active player.
51. See Charles Palmer, Drugs v. Privacy: The New Game In Sports, 2 MARQ. S oRgs L.
J. 175 (1992).
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ment for players who seek help but permanently disqualifies a player
who does not come forward and gets caught.52 But in baseball, the par-
ties have not agreed to a comprehensive drug program. Instead, the
Commissioner has promulgated and acted under his own guidelines. In
response, the Players Association has accepted some of his decisions and
challenged others.5 3
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF LEAGUE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEMS
This section will examine the specific disciplinary system that is or
was recently in place in each of the four major team sports. Although it
is organized structurally; discipline by the club, discipline by the commis-
sioner or president, and the applicable grievance procedures, some at-
tempt is made to highlight the "thematic" issues articulated in section
III.
A. Major League Baseball
In baseball, discipline may be imposed at three levels: by the club, by
the President of the League, and by the Commissioner. But common to
all is the rule that discipline may only be imposed for "just cause. '54 In
almost every case, the entity imposing discipline is required to give writ-
ten notice of such discipline to the player and the Players Association. 55
Players have the right to discover all documents and evidence "adduced
during any investigation."56 In addition, when possible, the Players As-
sociation must be notified in advance of any disciplinary interview of the
player.5 7
1. Discipline by the Club
The club's right to impose discipline is explicitly recognized in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.5 The specific power to discipline is
contained in the regulations incorporated in the Uniform Player's Con-
tract, which authorizes the club to impose a reasonable fine and/or a
suspension not to exceed thirty days, for a violation of any regulation or
52. NBA-CBA Art. XXXIII.
53. For a review of the status of the Commissioner's Drug Policy in baseball see Edward
Rippey, Contractual Freedom Over Substance-Related Issues In Major League Baseball, 1
SPoRTs LAw. J. 143 (1994).
54. MLB-CBA Art. XII (A).
55. Id. at Art. XII (B).
56. Id. at Art. XII (C).
57. Id. at Art. XII (E).
58. Id. at Art. XII (A).
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provision of the Uniform Player's Contract.5 9 The club also has the right
to terminate the contract if the player fails to conform to standards of
good conduct or good citizenship, fails to keep himself in good condi-
tion, or fails to obey the club's training rules. 6 °
2. Discipline by the Commissioner and League Presidents
As indicated previously, the Major League Agreement gave the
Commissioner in baseball broad authority to discipline any player for
any conduct deemed not to be in the "best interests of baseball.' '61 Simi-
lar authority to discipline is contained in Rule 21 of the Major League
Rules. In each Uniform Player's Contract, the player expressly agrees to
abide by the Major League Agreement, the Major League Rules, in ad-
dition to League Rules and Professional Baseball Rules, so long as those
rules do not conflict with specific provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement and the Uniform Player's Contract. 62
The collective bargaining agreement generally calls for binding reso-
lution through neutral arbitration for any grievance. But discipline for
on the field misconduct and some integrity related misconduct are han-
dled in a different manner.
a. On the Field Misconduct
Where a dispute involves a fine or suspension which has been im-
posed by the League President or the Commissioner, for conduct on the
playing field, the player has no recourse to neutral arbitration.63 Binding
"appellate" authority is retained in most cases by the very person who
has imposed the discipline.64
b. Integrity Issues
Although the Commissioner is given binding authority with respect
to action taken which involves "the preservation of the integrity of, or
the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball,"65 this
provision is narrowly construed. It was intended to cover disciplinary
action for gambling and not for other related discipline such as that for
59. Id. at 96, Regulation 5.
60. Id. at UNIFORM PLAYERS CONTRACr, para. 7.
61. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, Art. I, § 3.
62. MLB-CBA, UNIFORM PLAYERS CoNTRAcr, para. 9 (a).
63. Id. at Art. XI (C).
64. If a League President initially imposes a fine in excess of $500 or a suspension which
exceeds ten days, it may be appealed to the Commissioner. Id. at Art. XI (C)(2).
65. Id. at Art. XI (A) (1) (b).
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drugs.66 In baseball, discipline for misconduct like drug use is initiated
by the Commissioner, but can be reviewed and modified by a neutral
arbitrator.67
3. Grievance Procedure
Grievances with regard to discipline may be initiated by the player.
Generally, the player is initially required to resolve any dispute with his
club. If the matter is not resolved in that manner, step two calls for
appeal by the player or the Players Association to the Player Relations
Committee (an arm of Major League Baseball) and then to binding arbi-
tration.68 But in the case of discipline, the Players Association may only
appeal if the player agrees.69
B. Football
The new Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National
Football League Players Association and the National Football League
in May of 1993 has two articles on discipline: one governs discipline by
the club7 °, the other governs discipline by the Commissioner 71. While a
player can be disciplined by either, he may not be disciplined by both the
club and the Commissioner for the same act. When the Commissioner
imposes discipline it will supersede or preclude discipline by the club.72
1. Discipline by the Club
With regard to discipline by the club, the collective bargaining agree-
ment itemizes maximum fines for various violations. For example, the
maximum fine for reporting overweight is $50 per lb., per day.73 Each
66. This has been a sensitive issue for baseball. The original language was negotiated
While Bowie Kuhn was Commissioner. See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE Dn;FEP.NT BALL
GAME: THE INSrDE STORY OF BASEBALL's NENW DEAL 214-215 (1991). Successive Commis-
sioners have agreed to the original understanding behind and interpretation of that provision.
See e.g., letter from Francis Vincent to Donald M. Fehr, Attachment 4 to the MLB-CBA. In
addition, the players have reserved the right to reopen collective bargaining in the event that a
Commissioner attempts to exercise authority in a way that is inconsistent with that under-
standing. (MLB-CBA Art. XI (A)(1)).
67. See Major League Players Ass'n (Ferguson Jenkins), Dec. No. 41, Gr. No. 80-25; Bowie
K. Kuhn, Panel Dec. No. 54, Gr. No.s 84-1 and 84-2; Major League Players Ass'n (Pascual
Perez), Gr. No. 84-0, supra note 26.
68. MLB-CBA Art. XII (B).
69. Id. at Art. XII (E).
70. NFL-CBA Art. VIII.
71. Id. at Art. XI.
72. Id. at Art. VIII, § 3.
73. Id. at Art. VIII, § 1 (a).
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club is required to publish a list of the fines that it will impose for each of
the designated violations.74 The club is also admonished to impose dis-
cipline on a uniform basis but may treat players differently if there are-
"events which create an escalation of the discipline."'75
The items covered include conduct which does not take place on the
field, such as reporting late, losing equipment, failing to follow a rehabil-
itation program, and losing a playbook.76 It also includes some miscon-
duct on the playing field. For example, it subjects a player to a
maximum fine of $200 for throwing a football into the stands and a maxi-
mum fine of $2,000 if a player is ejected from the game.77
The most serious discipline which can be imposed is for "conduct det-
rimental to the club." For such conduct, the player can be fined up to
one week's salary or suspended without pay for up to four weeks. 78
Finally, the collective bargaining agreement provides that a player
may bring a "non-injury" grievance if he disagrees with the discipline.79
2. Discipline by the Commissioner
The NFL's Commissioner is given disciplinary authority of two types
of matters: conduct on the playing field and conduct which is detrimen-
tal to the integrity and public confidence in the game. 0
a. On the Field Conduct.
With regard to on the field conduct, discipline for "unnecessary
roughness or unsportsmanlike conduct" is initially imposed by a person
designated by the Commissioner after consultation with a representative
of the NFLPA.81 An appeal from that person's decision may be taken to
the Commissioner. Discipline for other on the field conduct is imposed
by the Commissioner in the first instance and the player, upon notice of
the Commissioner's action, may appeal to the Commissioner.
b. Conduct Detrimental to the Integrity of the Game
The NFL Player Contract created by the collective bargaining agree-
ment has a provision entitled "Integrity of Game" under which the
74. Id. at Art. VIII, § 2.
75. Id. at Art. VIII, § 3.
76. Id.
77. Id. at Art. VIII, § 1 (a).
78. Id.
79. Id. at Art. VIII, § 4.
80. Id. at Art. XI, § 1.
81. lId at Art. XI, § 1 (b).
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player "recognizes the detriment to the League and professional football
that would be result from impairment of public confidence in the honest
and orderly conduct of NFL games or the integrity and good character of
NFL players."'  Under that provision, the player gives the Commis-
sioner the right to fine, suspend or terminate the contract of a player, if
he accepts a bribe, agrees to fix a game, fails to report an offer of a bribe,
associates with gamblers, uses or provides any players with performance
enhancing drugs, or "is guilty of any other form of conduct reasonably
judged by the League Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or
professional football. 8 3
c. Rights on Appeal
Where a player or the NFLPA disagrees with the decision of the
Commissioner or, in the case of on the field conduct, his representative,
they may appeal back to the Commissioner. Upon such appeal, a hear-
ing will be held where the player has a right to be represented by counsel
of his choice.84 But the Commissioner's decision is final and binding.S5
3. Grievance Procedure
The collective bargaining agreement specifically allows a player to
file a grievance, and he need not wait for the union to do so. 6 The
collective bargaining agreement also authorizes a player to be repre-
sented by an attorney of his own choosing or the NFLPA at any hearing
held. 7
The collective bargaining agreement provides two different methods
resolving grievances. First, it provides for binding arbitration by a neu-
tral arbitrator jointly selected by the NFL and the NFLPA. s It also pro-
vides for resolution by a "Grievance Settlement Committee." This
committee consists of the Executive Director of the NFLPA and the Ex-
ecutive Vice President for Labor Relations of the NFL. If these two
agree on a resolution, that decision will be binding so long as no arbitra-
tion hearing on the grievance has been convened.89
82. Id at Appendix C: NFL PtAR CoNTRAcr, § 15.
83. Id.
84. Id. at Art. XI, § 3.
85. Id. at Art. XI, § 1 (c).
86. Id. at Art. IX, § 2.
87. Id. at Art. IX, § 10.
88. Id. at Art. IX, §§ 6 & 8.
89. Id. at Art. IX, § 13.
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C. Basketball
As in the other sports, players in basketball can be disciplined at two
levels: by their clubs and by the league. Although there is a right to
neutral binding arbitration for most grievances, the Commissioner is
given certain disciplinary rights with regard to on the field conduct and
integrity issues which are not subject to review.
1. Discipline by the Club
The club's right to discipline a player is expressly recognized by both
the Uniform Player Contract 9° and the collective bargaining agree-
ment.9 ' Exhibit G to the NBA-CBA contains a set of Standard Club
Rules which govern player conduct. Each club may draft its own supple-
mental rules, but those rules must be reviewed by the Players Associa-
tion. If the Players Association objects and files a grievance, the rules do
not become effective unless they are found to be reasonable by either a
Grievance Panel or an Impartial Arbitrator.92
The Standard Rules start out by telling the player that he is expected
to conduct himself both on and off the court according to the "highest
standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship," to conform
his personal conduct to "standards of good citizenship," and to refrain
from any conduct that might be "detrimental to the best interests of the
club or the NBA." If a player does not meet the standards or engages in
conduct detrimental to the club or the league, he is subject to fine, sus-
pension or may be held to be in material breach of his contract.9'
More specific rules relating to good conduct are also included. These
include rules covering discipline for criminal conduct,94 gambling,95 vio-
lence,96 and alcohol use.97 These rules also deal with less serious con-
duct and provide for fines for a variety of infractions including the
failure to have a proper uniform,98 being late to a fight,99 missing a prac-
tice, 00 and missing a promotional appearance.' 0 '
90. NBA-CBA, UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACr, para. 4.
91. Id. at Art. XXVIII, § 3 (.
92. Id. at Art. XXIII. See also Art. I, § 5 (f).
93. Id. at Exhibit G "Introduction."
94. Id. at Exhibit G "Professional Conduct."
95. Id. at Exhibit G "Gambling."
96. Id. at Exhibit G "Violence."
97. Id. at Exhibit G "Alcoholic Beverages."
98. Id. at Exhibit G "Equipment."
99. Id. at Exhibit G "Travel Arrangements."
100. Id at Exhibit G "Attendance and Punctuality at and for Practices, Meetings and
Games."
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2. Discipline by the Commissioner and the Board of Governors
Under the collective bargaining agreement and the Uniform Player
Contract, basketball players have agreed to subject themselves to disci-
pline by the Commissioner and the Board of Governors in accordance
with Rule 35 of the N.B.A. Constitution and By-Laws. °2 Rule 35 calls
for dismissal and a lifetime ban for anyone caught fixing a basketball
game and gives the Commissioner the power to impose discipline, at his
discretion, for gambling on any basketball game.0 3 It also allows the
Commissioner to fine a player for any statement he makes or endorses
which is prejudicial or detrimental to the best interests of basketball, and
to suspend or fine the player for conduct that is detrimental to the
NBA.' 4 Finally, Rule 35 allows the Commissioner to discipline a player
for contract tampering'05 and for conduct during a basketball game.10 6
Except where the Commissioner has disciplined a player for gam-
bling, the Commissioner's actions under Rule 35 are subject to review by
the Board of Governors. 10 7
3. Grievance Procedure
Grievances for disciplinary action can be initiated by a player or, with
the player's permission, by the Players Association. 03 In all grievances
regarding discipline, the issue to be determined is whether there has
been "just cause" for the penalty imposed.' 9
Grievances that are not resolved by the parties to the grievance can
be appealed to a Grievance Panel, consisting of two persons appointed
by the NBA and two persons appointed by the Players Association." 0 If
a majority of the Grievance Panel agrees on a resolution, that resolution
is binding."' If the matter is not resolved, it may be heard by the Impar-
tial Arbitrator."
101. Id. at Exhibit G "Promotional Appearances."
102. See id. at Art. I, § 5 (1) and UNIFORM PLAYER CoNTRAcr, para. 15.
103. NBA CONSTITUMON AND BY-LAWS, Rule 35 (a) & (g). A similar rule found the
basis of the discharge in Molinas, 190 F.Supp. at 241.
104. NBA CONSTION AND BY-LAWs, Rule 35 (c) and (e).
105. Id. at Rule 35 (f).
106. Id. at Rule 35 (d).
107. Id& at Rule 35 (h).
108. NBA-CBA Art. XXVIII, § 2 (a) (1).
109. I& at Art. XXVIII, § 3 (d).
110. It at Art. XXVIII, § 2 (c). The parties can agree to skip this step and go directly to
the Impartial Arbitrator.
111. Id. at Art. XXVIII, § 2 (c) (4).
112. Id. at Art. XXVIII, § 2 (c)- (5).
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The Impartial Arbitrator is given broad power to interpret and deter-
mine compliance with the collective bargaining agreement and player
contracts, but there are some special limits and procedures with regard
to discipline." 3 Any discipline imposed by the Commissioner (or his
designee) for conduct on the playing court or "concerning the preserva-
tion of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the
game of basketball," is not heard by the Impartial Arbitrator and may
only be appealed to the Commissioner. 114 There is also a kind of mini-
mum "amount in controversy requirement." A player cannot appeal to
the Impartial Arbitrator from any suspension which is less than five days
and cannot appeal a fine unless it exceeds $ 500 (if imposed by the club)
or $ 5,000 (if imposed by the Commissioner). 15
D. Hockey
The discipline system in hockey is somewhat different then the sys-
tem in other sports in that a neutral arbitrator may be given jurisdiction
over part of a dispute, i.e., determining the underlying facts, but at the
same time limited in his or her ability to interpret the operative rules.
As a result, careful attention must be paid not just to whether discipline
is subject to review by a neutral arbitrator, but also to the scope of
power given to the arbitrator.
1. Discipline by the Club
Hockey players may be disciplined by their club for violations of club
rules, so long as these rules are reasonable and the players receive
proper notice of the rules.'1 6 The only articulated limit on these rules is
that a player may not be fined for "'indifferent' play." ' 7 Conversely,
the collective bargaining agreement specifically authorizes clubs to im-
pose reasonable fines for players who report to work in an "overweight
condition."' 18 Under the Standard Player's Contract, a player is also
subject to discipline by the club for "any conduct impairing the thorough
and faithful discharge of the duties incumbent upon the Player.""' 9 The
113. Id at Art. XXVIII, § 2 (d) (3).
114. 1d. at Art. XXVIII, § 2 (f) (2).
115. Id. at Art. XXVIII, § 3 (g).
116. NHL-CBA Art. VII, § 7.02. See also par. 4 of the STANDARD PLAYER'S CoNTRAcr
(1986 Form; Revised 1988) [hereinafter "NHL-SPC"].
117. NHL-CBA Art. VII, § 7.03
118. Id.
119. NHL-SPC para. 4.
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normal discipline imposed may be a "reasonable fine" or suspension.120
But if the player's conduct amounts to a material breach, the contract
may be terminated. 121
2. Discipline by the President
A player can be disciplined by the league in a variety of circum-
stances. Section 17 of the N.H.L. Constitution and By-Laws contains
comprehensive guidelines on the circumstances and conduct which may
give rise to discipline, the nature of the discipline, and certain proce-
dures with regard to its implementation. For example, the rules provide
for immediate expulsion, at the discretion of the President, for throwing
a game or failing to report a solicitation to throw a game.12 The Presi-
dent is also given broad power to fine, suspend or expel any player for
any act which is "dishonorable, prejudicial to or against the welfare of
the League or the game of hockey," whether this act takes place "during
or outside the playing season.""z Players may also be disciplined for
public statements which are critical of the League, or the League "Offici-
ating Staff.'1 24
3. Grievance Procedure
The NEIL has an somewhat intricate grievance mechanism which di-
vides disciplinary grievances into two categories. Unresolved disputes as
to the facts giving rise to discipline, and disputes concerning an interpre-
tation of club rules or the collective bargaining agreement go to binding
arbitration before an independent arbitrator."z While a player may re-
quest arbitration when there is a factual dispute, only the club or the
NHLPA may seek arbitration where the dispute involves the interpreta-
tion of a club rule or the collective bargaining agreement. Disputes re-
garding the "severity" of discipline or the interpretation of the standard
player contract, the NHL Constitution, or By-Laws or league rules, go to
120. Id.
121. Id. at para. 14 (a).
122. NHL CONSTrrUTION AND BY-LAws, Rule 17.2.
123. Id. at Rule 17.3 (a). The President may delegate disciplinary authority that comes
under this rule for "incidents arising under the playing rules," i.e., game related misconduct.
This appears to supplement the power of on-ice officials to suspend players for up to twenty
games for on-ice misconduct.
124. Id. at Rule 17.4 (a). With regard to criticism of the officials or of the officiating, the
player may be fined up to $1,000.
125. NHL-CBA Art. 4.01, 4.02, and 4.03. Rule 17.8 of the NHL Constitution and By-
Laws also gives the player the right to a suspension reviewed by the President.
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the binding arbitration by the league President.1' 6 In the case of disci-
pline ordered by the President, there is a right of appeal to the Board of
Governors. 27
The power of the arbitrator is somewhat circumscribed even where
the arbitrator does have jurisdiction. For example, an arbitrator is
bound by a club's interpretation of its own rules so long as such an inter-
pretation is not "arbitrary and capricious." Moreover, the arbitrator
may not find a club's interpretation of a rule to be arbitrary or capricious
if there is a "rational basis" for the club's interpretation. 28
Disputes which involve more than one issue may be the subject of
two arbitration proceedings. For example, if there is a factual dispute
and a dispute as to the severity of the punishment, the factual issues may
be resolved initially by the arbitrator. His or her written decision will be
binding as to those facts, but the President will then get to decide on the
severity of the penalty.129
V. CONCLUSION
This article has focused, primarily, on an analysis of the systems
under which discipline may be imposed and challenged. Although there
are some complexities, for each sport there should be one or more per-
sons who work for the league or the players association who are familiar
with the rules and with relevant precedent. Since the league and the
players associations are ultimately responsible for making the collective
bargaining relationship work, you should be able to get immediate assist-
ance in the event that you or a client has a question.
In addition, you should recognize that whether an athlete gets disci-
plined, and the extent of discipline might depend as much on the skills of
an advocate, as on the rules. As in most areas of the law, settlement is
preferable to litigation. Even if a settlement cannot be reached, the de-
cision of an arbitrator or commissioner will be a product of the case that
is presented. The combination of thorough investigation and persuasive
presentation is the sine qua non of effective advocacy in this field of law.
126. NHL-CBA Art. 4.05.
127. NHL CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAwS, Rule 17.11. This right of appeal does not in-
clude action taken by the President for betting on a championship game.
128. NHL-CBA Art. 4.07.
129. 1d& at Art. 4.06.
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